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The Surrender of War Criminals to the
International Criminal Court
DR. GORAN SLUITER*

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2002, the Treaty of Rome established a permanent
court called the International Criminal court (ICC).' The ICC has
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. Legal commentators are anticipating an extension of
the ICC's jurisdiction to include the prosecution of crimes of
aggression. Like any other international criminal tribunal or
international organisation, the ICC can only fulfill this mandate
when it receives the necessary assistance from cooperating states.
The comparison of former Yugoslavia's International Criminal
Tribunal (ICTY) to "a giant without arms and legs" who "needs
artificial limbs to walk and work" is applicable to the ICC.2 Like
the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), the ICC must rely on the individual or collective efforts of
states to assist the ICC in a variety of ways. States' assistance with

* Lecturer in international law, Utrecht University and Judge at the Utrecht
District Court.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
According to Article 126 of the ICC Statute, the "Statute shall enter into force on the first
day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations." ICC Statute at 87. On April 11, 2002, a special U.N. ceremony
was held wherein ten states simultaneously ratified the ICC Statute, thereby increasing the
number of ratifying states to sixty. Information regarding the special U.N. signing
ceremony is available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/public.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2003).
2. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 13
(1998).
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the arrest and surrender of war criminals has received the most
attention because of the important consequences these acts have
on these individuals. The ICC Statute's requirement that the
accused be present for the trial to commence underlines the
importance of states to assist with the state's arrest and surrender.3
The invasive nature of their surrender deprives individuals of
liberty and exposes them to a foreign criminal justice system.
Thus, arrest and surrender raise issues of efficacy and expediency
on the one hand, and individual rights on the other.
This Article analyzes the efficacy and expediency of the ICC's
surrender regime and its impact on individual rights. In particular,
it addresses the scope of the obligation incumbent upon states to
provide assistance in arrests that result in effective and expedient
surrenders, and to what extent the surrender regime protects war
criminals' human rights. A discussion of these issues requires a
systematic analysis of the substantive and procedural elements of
the ICC surrender regime. In order to fully understand and
distinguish the particularities of the ICC surrender regime from
extradition law, some knowledge of the overall cooperative
relationships between states and the ICC is required.
Part II compares some key elements of the ICC cooperation
regime with interstate, ICTY, and ICTR legal assistance regimes.
Parts III and IV analyze the surrender proceedings at the ICC and
national levels. Part V analyzes the duty to surrender as provided
in the ICC Statute, and whether the grounds for refusing ICC
surrender requests includes traditional extradition.
Part VI
3. Article 63 of the ICC Statute provides that the accused shall be present during the
trial, although the accused may be removed from the courtroom in exceptional
circumstances. (e.g., the accused, if present in the courtroom, disrupts the proceedings).
ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 48; see William A. Schabas, Article 63: Trial in the Presence of
the Accused, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 803-08.

Article 61 provides prior to the commencement of trial, a hearing to confirm the charges
must be held. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 46. This hearing can be held in the absence of
the accused after he has waived his right to be present, has fled, or cannot be found. Id.
After the hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the
crimes charged. Id. This procedure is similar to the hearing that is conducted in the
absence of the accused provided for in Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(RPE) of the ICTY and ICTR.
JOHN R.W.D JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
304, 588 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter ICTY AND ICTR RULES]. Both the Article 61 hearing

and the Rule 61 hearing, however, are not equal to a trial, because the accused's guilt is
not decided. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 46; ICTY AND ICTR RULES at 304, 588.
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discusses the ICC surrender regime in the context of international
human rights law, and addresses the potential conflict between the
ICC surrender regime and states' existing obligations under
international human rights treaties.
II.

ARREST AND SURRENDER AS PART OF THE ICC LEGAL
ASSISTANCE REGIME

A. Extraditionand Surrender:Not Merely a Question of
Terminology
Article 102 of the ICC Statute defines both surrender and
extradition. Both concepts refer to a state's transfer of a person
to another criminal jurisdiction.5 The vital distinction between the
two is that surrender applies to the ICC, and extradition refers to
the prosecution or the enforcement of an individual's sentence in
another state. The purpose of this distinction is to ensure that
traditional extradition law is not applicable, mutatis mutandis, to
the special surrender regime.6 The application of traditional

4. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 77. The provision reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Statute:
(a) "surrender" means the delivering up of a person by a state to the Court,
pursuant to this Statute.
(b) "extradition" means the delivering up of a person by one State to
another as provided by treaty, convention, or national legislation.
5. Id. The definitions in Article 102 are silent as to the purpose of delivering up a
person. Arguably, the purposes of surrender and extradition are to prosecute the
requested person or to enforce a sentence. Traditionally, this is a part of the definition of
extradition provided in various extradition treaties. See, e.g., European Convention on
Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 1, Europ. T.S. No. 24 [hereinafter European Convention];
U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 45th Sess.,
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991) [hereinafter U.N. Model Treaty]. Extradition and
surrender are distinguishable from delivering up a person for other purposes, such as
giving testimony. Thus, transferring a detained witness for the purpose of giving
testimony does not fall within the realm of surrender or extradition. This clearly follows
from Article 93(7) regarding the interstate cooperation context where the transfer of
detained witnesses is not part of the extradition law, but treaties on other forms of mutual
assistance in criminal matters. See, e.g., European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
CriminalMatters, Apr. 20, 1959, art. 11, Europ. T.S. No. 30. The definition of surrender in
Article 102 includes these other forms of delivering up a person provided for in Article
93(7), therefore adding to the confusion in the terminology. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at
75, 77.
6. There are instances where persons are delivered up to other states for the purpose
of prosecution that are outside the realm of extradition. For example, under the Status of
Forces agreements, states that send troops practically exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
those soldiers. When they exercise their jurisdiction, the receiving state has a duty to hand
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extradition law creates a number of obstacles to the effective and
expeditious capture of war criminals. For this reason, the ICTY
and ICTR statutes and rules consistently avoid the term
"extradition," and instead use the word "transfer" or "surrender." 7
During the ICC Statute negotiations, the debate over the
terms "surrender" or "extradition" symbolized the delegates'
divergent views regarding the nature of the ICC surrender or
extradition regime. A few delegates strongly adhered to the use of
the term extradition, because "their national laws pertaining to
extradition prohibit them from handing over their nationals to the
court, and the use of 'extradition' would support their national
positions."' In the end a "use of terms" provision was adopted as a
compromise to accommodate the few states whose positions were
"that they do not consent to extradite nationals in general but only
accept such an obligation in the very specific context of the court." 9
The drafting history illustrates that the distinction between
surrender and extradition was not simply about terminology and
"legal sophistry."' ° The entire ICC legal assistance law, in addition
to the ICC surrender regime, aspired to base itself on different

over the requested person. See Agreement (with appendix) Between the Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. 7(5), 199
U.N.T.S. 78 [hereinafter North Atlantic Treaty].
7. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR,
3453rd mtg. at 7-8, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), available at http://wwics.si.edu/
subsites/ccpdc/pubs/addm/rwan.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003) [hereinafter ICTR Statute];
Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, at 5, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. Rules 55-61 of both Tribunals deal with arrest and transfer or
surrender and contain various references to transfer or surrender. See ICTY AND ICTR
RULES, supra note 3, at 215, 541. The ICTY Statute and ICTR Rules use the terms
'surrender' and 'transfer' interchangeably and there are no legal differences between the
two. See Bert Swart, Arrest and Surrender, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1639, 1678 (Antonio Cassese et al.
eds., 2002). For the sake of consistency, the choice of either term in the Statutes and
Rules would have been preferable.
8. Phakiso Mochochoko, International Cooperationand JudicialAssistance, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 305, 309 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); see Claus Kress, Article 102:
Use of Terms, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1157-58.
9. Kress, supra note 8, at 1157.
10. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 111 (2001).
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principles and content when com pared to traditional cooperation
models between sovereign states.
B. Legal Bases Underlying the Duty to Provide Legal Assistance
Distinguishing different regimes depends on the legal basis
underlying the applicable assistance provision that results in three
possible situations. First, party states are governed by the legal
assistance provision in the ICC Statute. Parties to the ICC
cooperation regime must perform their duties under the Statute in
good faith.'2 Because Article 120 of the ICC Statute prohibits
states from including certain reservations upon their ratification of
the Statute, the obligations apply identically to all party states.13
Second, the fundamental rule of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt prevents the ICC Statute from creating a legal basis that4
requires nonparty states to provide assistance to the ICC.'

Nonparty states, however, can provide assistance on a voluntary
basis, and may have a duty to provide assistance in two scenarios.
First, Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute provides that a nonparty
state may accept the ICC's jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The
voluntary acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction requires a nonparty
state's unconditional acceptance of all cooperation obligations
under the Statute. 5 Second, Article 87(5) provides that a nonparty
state can provide assistance through ad hoc cooperation
agreements with the ICC. Although the content of such future
agreements is often speculative, the ICC may base the content of
11. "[The] clear distinction at the terminological level should, as was the underlying
thinking, at the same time contribute to a growing awareness on the national level for the
substantial differences between horizontal and vertical cooperation." Kress, supra note 8,
at 1157-58 (citing Preliminary Remarks, Part 9, margin No. 3).
12. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13. The nuance in the application of this Statute is that states can issue certain
declarations upon their ratification of the Statute, which have a legal affect on their
obligations to provide legal assistance. Article 124 allows states to refuse the court's
jurisdiction over war crimes for a period of seven years. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 86.
A declaration made under Article 124 undeniably reduces the state's duty to provide
assistance. Pursuant to Article 87(2), a state's declaration of the language in which a
request for assistance is made is far less drastic. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 65.
14. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, at art. 34.
15. ICC Statute, supra note, 1. Whether it was a wise solution to link the acceptance
of jurisdiction to the full acceptance of cooperation obligations is questionable. States
may be sooner prepared to accept the court's jurisdiction thereby enabling the court to
commence its investigations and prosecutions to the extent that this would not ipso facto
impose a variety of unconditional cooperation obligations on the states.
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the ad hoc agreement on the ICC Statute's cooperation regime.
The nonstate party, whose cooperation is needed, however, has a
strong negotiation position. Therefore, the ICC faces the difficult
choice between refusing a state's assistance or accepting the
requested state's conditions in exchange for its assistance.
The third "cooperation regime" applies when the Security
Council refers a situation to the ICC. According to Article 13 of
the ICC Statute, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, may trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC. The
Security Council may accomplish this by referring a situation in
which one or more of the crimes mentioned in Article 5 of the
Statute are committed.1 6 In the future, when the Council triggers
the ICC's jurisdiction, this resolution may also supplement the
Statute's cooperation regime. The resolution can be used to
obligate U.N. members to provide assistance to restore and
maintain international peace and security. 7
16. The possibility that the Security Council will refer "cases" to the court is
recognized in the International Law Commission's draft statute for an International
Criminal Court. See Report of the I.L.C. on the Work of Its Forty-Ninth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 84 (1994) [hereinafter Report of
the I.L.C.]. Within the compilation of proposals forming the basis for the negotiations in
Rome, however, the possibility that the Security Council will submit cases to the court is
only mentioned as an option. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 34
(1998) [hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee]. For background on the
relationship between the court and the Security Council, see Lionel Yee, The International
CriminalCourt and The Security Council: Articles 13 (b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,

RESULTS 143-52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); Sir Franklin Berman, The Relationship Between
the InternationalCriminal Court and the Security Council, in HERMAN A. M. VON HEBEL
ET AL., REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR

OF ADRIAAN BOS 173-80 (Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999); Gabrielle
H. Oosthuizen. Some Preliminary Remarks on the Relationship Between the Envisaged
International Criminal Court and the U.N. Security Council,46 NETH. INT'L L. REV., 313,
313-42 (1999).
17. For more detail, see GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE: OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 71-72
(2002), (distinguishing three possible scenarios where the Security Council may submit a
case to the court in the area of legal assistance):
First of all, the Security Council may refer a situation, which it may describe in
more detail, in a resolution to the court, without any further comments or
details. In this [situation] the matter will be dealt with in accordance with the
Statute and the duty to cooperate will be exclusively based on the Statute,
meaning, for example, that states non-parties are under no obligation to assist
the court.
A second, more likely, scenario [ ] is that a Chapter VII resolution
submitting a matter to the court decides that all states - or all UN members -
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This Article illustrates that the applicable cooperation regime
may vary. Which regime applies depends on the state whose
assistance is sought, as well as on the manner in which the
investigation has been triggered. Because the content of other
cooperation regimes are too speculative, the following discussion
only analyses the ICC Statute's cooperation and surrender
regimes.
C. The ICC: A Vertical CooperationRegime?
The distinctive features of the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR
cooperation laws are best described in comparison to cooperation
regimes that states have been familiar with for a long time. There
are a number of common features to the interstate, or horizontal,
legal assistance regimes. Similar to the debate between the use of
the terms extradition or surrender, it is assumed that, like the
This
ICTY and ICTR, the ICC is superior to the states.
assumption has resulted in the characterization of these
cooperation models as "vertical" or "supranational."'" This
hierarchical relationship is justified by the nature of the crimes

shall co-operate with the court in accordance with its Statute. The resolution,
and ultimately the UN Charter, would then constitute the legal basis for the duty
to co-operate for all UN members. The duty to co-operate would, for states that
are members of the United Nations but not parties to the Statute, be confined to
the investigation submitted to the court by the Council. The scope of the duty to
co-operate would not differ from that incumbent on state parties in case of an
investigation triggered by a state or initiated by the Prosecutor. As a result, the
grounds of refusal set out in the Statute are applicable to and can be invoked by
the states non-parties.
The third and final option is that the Security Council, with a view to
restoring international peace and security, decides that UN members should
have the obligation to cooperate fully with the court. To be more specific, the
Council could decide that (certain of) the grounds for refusal in the ICC Statute
are not applicable to UN members. This seems an unlikely situation because it
requires that the Council shapes a new cooperation regime, which may be
difficult to reconcile with the legal framework in which the court has to operate.
Furthermore, this may be seen as an unauthorised interference with the
application in practice of the Statute.
18. The concept horizontal and vertical legal assistance relationships was introduced
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Blagkic subpoena case, indicating the hierarchy
between the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals and the consequences of states providing
legal assistance. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Bla~kic, Judgement on the Request of the
Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case
No. IT-95-14-ARlO8bis, A. Ch., Oct. 29, 1997, para. 47, International Criminal Tribunal
http://www.un.org/ictylblaskic/appealldecision-e/
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia,
71029JT3.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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within the ICC's jurisdiction and the international community's
participation and support of these endeavors. Nevertheless,
understanding the meaning of this "verticalism" and whether the
ICC really fits this description, when compared to the ICTY and
ICTR cooperation regimes, is still questionable. Three important
distinctive characteristics of the ICC cooperation regime must be
discussed to provide the answers.
1. Grounds for Refusal
Traditional extradition treaties generally contain a variety of
grounds on which the requested state may or must refuse to assist
another state. 9 As a result, the extent of the obligation to provide
assistance to another state is generally quite limited. 20
In a vertical cooperation relationship, whereby a
supranational criminal tribunal requests assistance, the grounds for
refusal of the interstate legal assistance treaties are not applicable
to the same degree as the grounds contained in the ICC, ICTY or
ICTR cooperation regimes. The ICC surrender regime has done
away with the bulk of the traditional grounds for refusal, such as
the political offence exception, the double criminality requirement,
and the refusal to extradite nationals. The ICC surrender regime,
however, contains a few procedural and substantive grounds for
refusal to surrender that the ICTY and ICTR laws do not provide.
The strongest difference among these institutions is that the ICC
does not benefit from a priority rule similar to that contained in
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter. The ICC accommodates the
concerns of states that have competing obligations under
international law, including extradition treaties. 2

19. Cf. European Convention, supra note 5; U.N. Model Treaty, supra note 5, at 3-7.
20. Generalizations, however, must be used carefully. Cooperative states, such as the
European Union, may be prepared to engage in more far reaching forms of cooperation in
criminal matters. An example is the inapplicability of a European arrest warrant to
traditional extradition law. Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on
the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between the Member states,
pmbl. (12) 2001 O.J. (C 332) 306.
21. See SLUITER, supra note 17, at 167-69; cf Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 166

(1999). "[Olne would have thought that the obligations stemming from the Rome Statute
should have taken precedence over those flowing from other treaties." Id.
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2. Reciprocity

Generally, states are only prepared to provide legal assistance
to another state
S
22if that state can be expected to reciprocate such
The principle of reciprocity is derived from
legal assistance.
various legal assistance treaties.23 International criminal tribunals
were created to prosecute only a limited number of crimes.
Therefore, in principle, a state's assistance is given to the tribunals
exclusively. This is not to say that in certain situations, the
assistance of international criminal tribunals toward states is not
The concurrent jurisdiction of these tribunals,
welcomed.
however, prevents these institutions from being able to prosecute
all perpetrators.
The drafters of the Rome Statute acknowledged that the
ICC's assistance toward a state may advance the prosecution of
war criminals-a possibility that is provided for in the Statute.
Article 93(10) of the ICC Statute authorizes the ICC to cooperate
with, and provide assistance to, a party state that is prosecuting
crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction or a serious ,crime under the
requesting state's national law. The ICC has no duty to provide
any assistance,24 which makes it difficult to characterize a truly
reciprocal and equally cooperative relationship between the ICC
and the states. This lack of reciprocity is another distinctive
feature of the ICC cooperation model.
Reciprocity poses additional problems in the context of
surrender. Article 101's rule of specialty acts as an obstacle to
prosecute an individual in any state other than where the
individual was arrested.2'
3. Dispute Settlement
If a dispute occurs regarding the extent of the duty to
cooperate, the legal assistance relationship between states should

22. This is not to say that lack of reciprocity is always a material ground for refusing
the requested assistance. See Heinrich Gruitzner, International Judicial Assistance and
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, 2 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION 189,
230 (1973).
23. Cf., e.g., European Convention, supra note 5.
24. See Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Articles 93, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1117, 1117.
25. See discussion infra Part V.E for the rule of speciality as a condition to surrender.
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be settled through diplomatic means or third party adjudication.
Although a considerable number of legal assistance treaties do not
provide for compulsory settlement of disputes through these
methods, states may still accept the International Court of Justice's
(ICJ) jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.26 It is unthinkable that in
a horizontal cooperation relationship, either the requesting or the
requested side will resolve disputes regarding the duty to provide
legal assistance.
There is a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism in a
vertical cooperation relationship where a hierarchically superior
international criminal tribunal is assisted. The task of settling
disputes of the requesting party is the most fundamental deviation
from the horizontal legal assistance model as it is most indicative
of a legal assistance relationship based on hierarchy. Contrary to
the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Statute explicitly
regulates the settlement of disputes between states and the ICC.
Article 119(1) of the ICC Statute provides that "[a]ny dispute
concerning the judicial functions of the court shall be settled by the
decision of the court."27
Any questions concerning the cooperation with, and legal
assistance to, the ICC are part of the "judicial functions of the
court.,

28

Article 87(7) confirms the ICC's power to issue judicial

29
findings for disputes over the extent of the duty to cooperate.

26. This is a distinction between conventions where legal assistance is only one
element and conventions where legal assistance is the exclusive object. The first category
includes those specialized U.N. Conventions combating organized crime and drug
trafficking. These conventions provide for compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms,
such as the International Court of Justice. States, however, may include reservations to
relevant provisions. See United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (with annex), Dec. 20, 1988, art. 32(2), 1582 U.N.T.S.
165; United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess. Agenda Item 105, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001). For conventions that
do not contain provisions related to dispute settlement, see European Convention, supra
note 5; President's Message to Congress Transmitting Inter-American Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Jan. 10, 1995); U.N. Model Treaty, supra note 5.
27. ICC Statute, supra note 1.
28. See Roger Clark, Article 119, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra
note 3, at 1245.

29. See Alain Pellet, Settlement of Disputes, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
A COMMENTARY 1843 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002) (concluding that Article 119, when read in conjunction with Article 87(7),
"empowers the court to make findings on all questions relating to cooperation between
states and the ICC").
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
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Party states conceded to the ultimate interpretation of the extent
of the duty to cooperate when they ratified the Statutes and
accepted Article 119, in particular. This ratification included their
concession to the interpretation of the duty to arrest and surrender
war criminals to the requesting side, which is typically the ICC.
D. Enforcement of the Duty to Cooperate
The ICC cooperation regime succeeded in duplicating the
"vertical model" of the ICTY and ICTR cooperation regimes.
Although the cooperation model looks strong on paper, providing
assistance to the ICC will depend on the availability of effective
methods to enforce the state's duty to cooperate.
Such
enforcement mechanisms include the prosecutor or the party
state's ability to trigger the duties of contracting parties regarding
investigation and prosecution. 0
Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute, a clear process
exists for inducing a party state's compliance with a request for
assistance.
First, the ICC may make a judicial finding of
noncompliance where a party state fails to comply with a request
to cooperate with the ICC. A judicial finding of noncooperation is
dual in character. It is an enforcement measure. As such, the
impact of an impartial international judicial body establishing that
a state has breached its obligations under an international treaty
should not be underestimated. Such a finding, establishing a
noncooperating state's illegal actions, may induce its compliance.
Second, a judicial finding of noncompliance satisfies the vital
prerequisite to submit the matter to those institutional bodies
designated to enforce the Statute.
After a judicial finding of noncompliance, the ICC may refer
the matter to the Assembly of States (Assembly). This process
offers an end-run around the Prosecutor's direct submission of a
state's noncompliance to the Assembly.3" Pursuant to Article

30. The enforcement of a duty to cooperate on the basis of an ad hoc cooperation
agreement or following the referral of a situation by the Security Council is beyond the
scope of this Article. For enforcement mechanisms in these situations, see Goran Sluiter,
State Cooperation with the ICC, in TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CHEMICAL

WEAPONS CONVENTION 135-36 (Rodrigo Yepes-Enriquez & Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002).
31. The approach adopted in Rule 7 bis (B) of the ICTY and ICTR gives the
Prosecutor the option to report instances of non-compliance to the President, who may
then report it to the Security Council. ICTY AND ICTR RULES, supra note 3, at 227, 545.
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112(2)(f), the Assembly may "consider pursuant to article 87,
paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non-cooperation."32
The Statute's silence on the measures to impose on a state in
breach of its obligation to cooperate is surprising, and calls into
question the effectiveness of the Assembly's responses to
violations of the duty to cooperate. This observation raises other
inconsistencies among the states' other duties under the Statute.
For example, if a party state fails to meet its obligations to finance
the ICC, the Statute specifically provides that the state shall,
depending on the extent of the breach, have no vote in the
Assembly and in the Bureau.33 The ICC could also enforce similar
measures when a state breaches its duty to provide legal assistance
to the ICC.
III.

ISSUING REQUESTS FOR ARREST AND SURRENDER: THE
INTERNAL PROCEDURE

There are two elements of the ICC's internal procedure to
request the surrender of an individual. First, the ICC's issuance of
an arrest warrant is governed by Article 58. Second, the issuance
of a surrender request is governed by Part 9 of the Statute.
A. The Procedureof Article 58: Arrest
1. Competent Organ
In the overwhelming majority of cases, national authorities
must arrest the person before they surrender the person for the
purpose of prosecution. 34 Article 58 regulates the issuance of an
arrest warrant. The Pre-Trial Chamber is designated to issue
arrest warrants.35 Here, the Statute is consistent with international
human rights instruments and the practice in many national
32. For more detail on the role of the Assembly of states Parties, see Adriaan Bos,
Assembly of States Parties,in 2

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT: A COMMENTARY 297-314 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
33. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 82-83.
34. Even when the individual is already detained, an arrest warrant by the ICC should
be issued to ensure his continued detention in a form of constructive custody. Article
58(7) authorizes the issuance of a summons to appear when a summons is sufficient to
ensure the person's appearance. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 44.
35. For a more thorough analysis of the role and powers of the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber, see Olivier Fourmy, Powers of the Pre-TrialChambers,in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1207-30 (Antonio Cassese
et al. eds., 2002).
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criminal jurisdictions because judicial intervention is required to
deprive a person of his or her liberty.36 In urgent situations,
however, human rights law and common practice in domestic
criminal jurisdictions permit prosecutorial or police authorities to
arrest and detain an individual, but only under the condition that
he or she is brought promptly before a judicial authority.37
Contrary to the ICC's legal framework, the ICTY and ICTR Rules
of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) empower the prosecutor, in
urgent situations, to directly request any state to arrest a suspect.38
The ICC framers did not believe similar powers were necessary
because the delegation reached an agreement on the creation of a
Pre-Trial Chamber that had various powers in the pre-trial phase.
The Chamber included the power to issue arrest warrants.39
Pursuant to Article 58(1) of the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber
issue's warrants based the prosecutor's application at any time
after the initiation of an investigation. The language of Article
58(1) appears flexible enough to deal with urgent situations.
2. Conditions for Issuance
As in many national criminal jurisdictions, the conditions
under which the Pre-Trial Chamber must issue an arrest warrant
are twofold. First, the prosecutor must show there are "reasonable
36. That arrests in the absence of a warrant do not take place "in accordance with the
law" and thus amount to arbitrary arrest is consistent with international human rights
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dimitry L. Gridin v. Russian Federation, Communication No.
770/1997, July 20,2000, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/69/D/770/1997, U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex 9, at 172-77, see also U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (2000) (discussing the Human
Rights Committee's supervision of the states' observance of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights).
37. Cf. Article 5(3) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 9 (3)
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
38. ICTY AND ICTR RULES, supra note 3, at 40. ICTY case law confirms that the
power of the Prosecutor to request an individual's provisional arrest does not depend on
the issuance of a previous arrest warrant. See Prosecutor v. Mucic, Decision on the
Motions for the Exclusion of Evidence by the Accused, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES
OF

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

TRIBUNALS:

THE

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998 227 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter

eds., 1999).
39. For the negotiation history and creation of the Pre-Trial Chamber, see Fabricio
Guariglia, Investigation and Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:

234-38 (Roy S.
Lee ed., 1999). The ICTY and ICTR Statutes did not provide for pre-trial judicial
involvement. In fact, an arrest warrant can only be issued by a Judge or Chamber after
confirmation of the indictment. ICTY Statute, supra note 7, at 5; ICTR Statute, supra note
7, at 7-8.
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
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grounds" to believe the person concerned committed a crime
within the court's jurisdiction.40 Second, the person must be
arrested for a specific purpose. 4' The ICC Statute's conditions for
the issuance of an arrest warrant are stricter than the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes. The latter instruments,
42 or the applicable RPE, do
not contain the condition of necessity.

As previously mentioned, pursuant to Article 58(1)(a), the
Prosecutor must meet the burden of proving "reasonable
grounds." It is unclear, and thus remains to be settled in future
jurisprudence, whether this level lies below the criterion of a prima
facie case, which is the standard provided for in Article 19(1) of
the ICTY Statute and Article 18(1) of the ICTR Statute.43
Although the "reasonable grounds" standard is the minimum
standard under Article 58, the actual standard applied by the PreTrial Chamber, however, may be more demanding, depending on
where the arrest warrant is to be executed. For example, pursuant
to Article 91(2)(c), the court is obliged to accompany an arrest
warrant with sufficient information and evidence to meet the
requirements for the surrender process in the requested state. In
the practice of the ICTR, domestic evidentiary requirements are
more demanding than the prima facie standard applied by the

40. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 43.
41. Id.
42. The ICTY and ICTR arrest procedures are based on the questionable assumption
that a certain level of proof that an individual has committed crimes within the Tribunals'
jurisdiction is sufficient grounds for arrest. The apparent irrelevance of this condition
derives from the ICTR's Rule 65, according to which an accused must prove exceptional
circumstances to obtain a judicial order for provisional release. From the perspective of
human rights, the reverse situation is far more appropriate. The Prosecutor should offer
proof to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. The ICTY Judges have amended Rule 65
by removing the exceptional circumstances requirement. Therefore, the matter is highly
controversial in ICTR case law. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Decision on the Defence's
Motion for Release or Alternatively Provisional Release of Ferdinand Nahimana, Case
No. IT-99-52-T, T. Ch. 1, 5 Sept. 2002.
43. Fourmy, supra note 34, at 1219. In ICTY jurisprudence a prima facie case is "a
credible case which would (if not contradicted by the defense) be a sufficient basis to
convict him of that charge."

See, Prosecutor v. Milogevic, in ANNOTATED LEADING

CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998 35, 36, para. 4 (Andre Klip &

Goran Sluiter eds., 1999); Decision on the Review of the Indictment, Prosecutor v Kordic,
Case No. IT-95-14-I, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 10 Nov. 1995, at 3 (adopting the
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), at 95).
Arguably, the "reasonable grounds" test seems to lie below this standard.
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Tribunal. 4 Therefore, with a view to swift execution of the arrest
warrant, it is recommended that both the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial
Chamber anticipate these domestic requirements.
Article 58(1)(b) lists three alternative purposes that the arrest
should serve. One such purpose is "to ensure the person's
appearance at trial.45 However, because the court lacks an
effective enforcement mechanism, Article 58(1)(b) presents a
fairly low threshold for applicability.
B. The Issuance and the Transmission of the Request for Arrest
and Surrender
Article 58(5) of the ICC Statute connects the issuance of the
arrest warrant with the issuance of a request for arrest and
surrender to a state. According to this provision, the court may
issue such a request under Part 9, only after an arrest warrant has
been issued under Article 58.46 Part 9 contains the regulations and
conditions pertaining to the issuance and transmission of requests
for an arrest and surrender, with one important exception: the
provisions under Part 9 are procedural.
The procedural requirements are set out in Articles 87 and 91
of the Statute. Sections 1 and 2 of Article 87 contain regulations
on the channel of communications and the choice of languages
regarding requests for assistance. According to Article 87(1)(a),
requests for assistance shall be transmitted through the diplomatic
channel or any other appropriate channel designated by each state
party. The language of the request shall be in the official language
of the requested state or one of the court's working languages, as
the state party chooses. 47 These regulations are similar to those in

44. The transfer of Eliziphan Ntakirutimana from the United States to the ICTR was
refused by a U.S. District court holding that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
standard was not met. In re Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
The matter was remedied on appeal, after the ICTR had supplemented the available
evidence. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 428, 430 (5th Cir. 1999).
45. In domestic criminal jurisdictions, this ground is known as the "risk of flight" and
is generally applied to suspects of foreign nationality or to suspects without a permanent
residence.
46. The power to issue requests for assistance is attributed to the court as a whole,
including all of its organs. Part 9 does not specify the organ empowered to request the
arrest and surrender. It appears self-evident, however, that the Pre-Trial Chamber
remains the competent organ in this respect.
47. Some thirty states have lodged a declaration under Article 87(2) of the Statute
concerning the choice of languages. Concerning those states which have not done so, they
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the Inter-State Cooperation Model. 48 It is clearly a concession to
states in favour of a more horizontally oriented cooperation
model.4 9 One may wonder whether strict adherence to diplomatic
channels and choice of national languages may not hamper the
effective provision of legal assistance. ° More flexible rules on this
matter seem more appropriate in light of the nature of the
relationship between states parties and the court.
Article 91 of the Statute contains the procedural requirements
pertaining to requests for arrest and surrender. The request for
arrest and surrender must contain a description that is sufficient to
identify the person sought, a copy of the arrest warrant, and in
case the person sought has already been convicted, a copy of the
judgement of conviction. More controversial is Article 91(1)(c),
which requires that the request be supported by documents,
statements or information as may be necessary to meet the
requirements for the surrender process in the requested state.
This provision concerns the required domestic evidentiary
standard for arrest and surrender. The issue was a matter of great
concern for common law states." States found it unacceptable to
arrest and surrender individuals without the same level of proof
required under domestic law.52 In response to the states'
objections, Article 91 allowed the same application of evidentiary
requirements as those applicable to requests for extradition. This
may result in different evidentiary standards in the practice of
arrest and surrender. Whereas certain states may not require
further evidence from the court and will be satisfied by the

will receive requests for assistance in one of the working languages of the court, English or
French. See ICTY AND ICTR RULES, supra note 3, at 219.
48. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 7, 9.
49. See Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 87, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1055,1057-58.

50. In urgent situations, there may not be enough time to go through diplomatic
channels to translate a request into an official national language. The Statute and Rules
do not provide flexible rules regarding channels of communications and choice of
languages. As a result, even in urgent situations, party states may insist on a channel of
communication and choose a language that is tantamount to a ground for refusal. See ICC
Statute, supra note 1, at 69.
51. For more detail, see Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 91, in COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1091.

52. Id.
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"evidentiary test" applied by the court that issued the arrest
warrant, other states may be more demanding.
Article 98 of the ICC Statute imposes a more substantive
condition on the issuance of arrest and surrender requests by the
court. According to this provision, the court may not proceed with
a request for surrender that will force the requested state to act
inconsistently with its obligations in the field of state and
diplomatic immunity, and its obligations under treaties that
require the consent of a sending state for surrender (so-called
status of forces agreements). Although this provision acts as a
condition to the issuance of a request for assistance, it can also be
inserted in the Statute as a material ground for refusing the
provision of assistance, as was done with other competing
obligations under international law.53 This provision will be
examined further as a material, ground for refusal in Part V.C.2
below.
IV. PROCEEDINGS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The implementation of a request for arrest and surrender is
governed by both Article 59 and the relevant provisions of Part 9
of the Statute. Whereas Part 9 contains essentially obligations that
give effect to the request, Article 59 contains the method of
implementation. The interplay between Part 9, in particular
Articles 89 and 58, is complicated. According to Article 89(1),
national procedures govern the treatment of requests for arrest
and surrender. This suggests that a state is free to choose the
means and method of implementation, as long as surrender is
obtained. This freedom, however, is restricted by Article 59 of the
Statute, which contains a number of concrete obligations regarding
the implementation of a request for arrest. In addition to Article
59, state implementing a request for arrest and surrender must
comply with the provisions of Article 55.
Article 55 grants a
number of rights to individuals during an investigation; the most

53. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 57, 67-69. With respect to immunity obligations,
however, a number of delegations found it unacceptable that the court could place a state
in a potential position of conflict with existing obligations. See Kimberly Prost & Angelika
Schlunck, Article 98,. in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note

1132.

3,

at 1131,

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:605

important right being the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest or
detention.
A. Organisationof the Arrest Proceedings
The obligations of Article 59 protect the rights of the arrested
person at the national level. The provision underlines the duty to
comply swiftly with requests for arrest, a matter that is dealt with
in Part 9. The desire to ensure protection of individual rights at
the national level is recommended, even if it seems to contradict
the division of tasks between the court and national jurisdictions
regarding arrest and surrender. The Statutes and Rules of the
ICTY and ICTR do not contain a similar provision.55 This
protection is included because the Tribunal violated the arrestees'
rights when it initially requested the arrest.
Article 59 contains a number of important safeguards for the
arrested person. First, the custodial state is obligated to bring the
arrested person promptly before its judicial authorities.57 The
judicial authorities must then determine whether the arrest
warrant applies to the arrested person, whether the person was
arrested according to proper procedure, and whether the person's
rights have been respected. It is unclear what these obligations
entail exactly. In particular, it is unclear what is meant by the

54. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 52. Furthermore, Article 55(2) applies to the
Prosecutor or national authorities' questioning of an individual, pursuant to a request
made under Part 9. It also applies to hearings connected with the Article 59 arrest
proceedings. As a result, the arrested person is entitled to remain silent, to have legal
assistance of his choosing and to be questioned in the presence of counsel. In particular,
this last right is not obvious in several civil law jurisdictions with respect to extradition
related interrogations. See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Mucic, supra note 38, at 227.
55. "The provisions in the RPE of the Tribunals on arrest and detention of suspects
and accused persons for the purpose of transferring them to their seats mainly concentrate
on the duties of states vis-A-vis the Tribunals. To a certain extent these rules neglect the
rights of the individual persons concerned .... " Bert Swart, Arrest Proceedings in the
Custodial State, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1247, 1251 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
56. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 1994-1999, ALC-II-129 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001);
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
1994-1999, ALC-II-129 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
57. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 45; see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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"person's rights.""8 Are these rights under domestic law, under the
Statute, or under international human rights law? Commentators
have suggested that the drafters essentially had international
human rights law in mind, especially the arrested person's right to
be informed about the charges and the grounds for detention, as
protected by Article 9(2) of the ICCPR. 9 However, the ordinary
meaning of "person's rights" is much broader.
Given the
mandatory language used in Article 59(2), "shall determine," it is
likely a national judge may review the arrest in light of a
considerable number of individual rights.
Second, Article 59(3) protects the arrested person's right to
apply for an interim release to the competent authority in the
custodial state that implements the protection offered by Article
9(4) of the ICCPR. The fact that national authorities can
eventually order the interim release of an arrested person, without
the permission of the court, deviates greatly from the ICTY and
ICTR arrest proceedings and would fit better into a "horizontal"
cooperation model. 6°
Nevertheless, the national judicial
authorities must give full consideration to the recommendations
made by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on the arrested person's
interim release.61 It comes as no surprise that strict conditions
govern the interim release applications, because they were driven
by the fear that detention might too easily be suspended. Thus,
Article 59(4) mentions "exceptional circumstances, 62 and
"safeguards . . . to ensure . . . surrender." Article 59(4) also
explicitly provides that national authorities may not consider
whether the arrest warrant was properly issued under Article 58.
This limitation is unique because no other provision in the Statute
or Rules prevents a state from addressing the legality of a request
for assistance.6 3 Strictly speaking, one should distinguish the arrest

58.
59.

ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 45.
See Angelika Schlunck, Article 59, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE,

supra note 3, at 765, 768. In light of the rights set out in the Statute, a national review of
the arrest warrant, especially the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention,

exceeds the competence of the national judge. Swart, supra note 7, at 1253-54.
60. Swart, supra note 7, at 1254.

61. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 74; see also ICTY AND ICTR RULES, supra note
3. at 452.
62. For an example of an arrested person who is on death row, see Schlunck, supra
note 59, at 769.
63. See infra Part IV.B.
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warrant from the request for arrest and surrender. The former is
not susceptible to review at the national level, whereas the latter is
subject to the requirements of Article 91(2)(c), and must be
supported by sufficient evidence. An interim release on account of
insufficient evidence is, therefore, not based on the ultra vires
character of the warrant, but on an alleged court violation of
Article 91(2)(c).
Once the requested person is ordered to be surrendered, he
shall be delivered to the court as soon as possible. After surrender,
an initial appearance before the Pre-Trial Chamber follows, and
the Chamber ensures that the various rights concerning arrest and
detention are observed in accordance with Article 60 of the ICC
Statute.64
B. Protectionof the rights of the arrestedperson
The Statute purports to protect the arrested person's rights
both at the domestic level and within the jurisdiction of the court.
However, the extent to which the arrested person will in fact
benefit from this protection is a different matter. It depends on
the enforcement of the obligations set out in Article 59 and the
availability of legal remedies for any violation of individual rights.
Under Article 59, a state has the duty to adequately supervise
the individual rights of the arrested person. Additionally, because
these obligations are imposed by Statute, the court should have a
role in their enforcement as well. The protection of individual
rights, however, is a different nature than the cooperation
obligations under Part 9 of the Statute. Consequently, the
obligations under Article 59 appear exempt from the enforcement
mechanism of Article 87(7), which allows the court to refer
noncompliant states to the Assembly of States Parties. It is also
exempt from any action taken by the Assembly of States Parties
pursuant to Article 112(2)(f).
Another issue concerning the practical application of Article
59 is the availability of legal remedies. As previously discussed,
Article 59(2) requires national judicial authorities to determine
whether the arrested person's rights have been respected.
However, the provision is silent as to what happens upon a

64. Article 55 is not the only provision that sets out applicable rights. Under Article
21(3), the entire human rights corpus could bind the court in its activities. For more detail,
see SLUITER, supra note 17, at 46.
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determination that a person's rights have in fact been violated. Do
the national authorities grant the remedies they deem
appropriate? Although this may follow from the role attributed to
the national authorities, as envisaged by Article 59(2), the
competent national court cannot grant remedies that may impede
the execution of the request without first consulting with the
court.6' As such, immediate release would be in violation of a
state's obligations under the Statute.6
The Statute is also silent as to whether appellate proceedings
at the national level are permissible. However, given the
references to domestic law in both Article 59(1) and Article 89(1)
of the Statute, appellate proceedings are not likely to be
excluded.67 Moreover, depending on the custodial state, the

arrested person may request the international human rights courts
or supervisory mechanisms to review the arrest and surrender in
6
light of the state's obligations under certain human rights treaties. 1
A court may not easily grant the release of a person accused
of the most serious international crimes. 69 However, with respect
to serious human rights violations in the course of or following the
arrest, the effective legal remedies provision may be indispensable

65. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 75. Accord infra Part V.B (analyzing the duty to
consult).
66. The abduction of the person accompanied by serious mistreatment is an exception
for egregious violations of human rights in the apprehension of the requested person. In
this situation, the competent national judge may rightfully assume that his duties under
Article 59(2) do not tolerate any further detention.
67. A majority of party states will not, in light of the remedies available under the
ICC Statute, provide appellate procedures with respect to surrender to an international
criminal tribunal. E.g., Article 27(4) of the Dutch "ICC Cooperation Act" (Official
citation: Rijkswet van 20 juni 2002 tot uitvoering van het Statuut van het Internationaal
Strafhofmet betrekking tot de samenwerking met en bijstandaan het InternationaalStrafhof
en de tenuitvoerlegging van zijn vonnissen (Uitvoeringswet Jnternationaal Strafhof)
(Staatsblad2002, 314)) (translated into English by author).
68. The only example is the complaint by Naletilic, to the European Convention on
Human Rights, claiming that his surrender to the ICTY by Croatia would violate the
latter's obligations under the Human Rights Convention.
In particular, plaintiff
contended that the ICTY would not offer him a fair trial. The plaintiff placed the
emphasis on the actual surrender rather than the method of arrest and ensuing detention.
Naletilic v. Croatia, EUR. CT. OF H.R. App. No. 51891/99 (2000) available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
69. See Susan Lamb, The Power of Arrest of the International Criminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 165, 240 (2000).
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in preservingthe integrity of the subsequent international criminal
proceedings.7
V.

THE DUTY TO SURRENDER THE REQUESTED PERSON

The central issue, both for the custodial state and for the
arrested person, remains the precise content of the duty to
surrender. As previously stated, the ICC surrender regime imposes
heavier obligations on states than on traditional international
extradition law. 7' The section below discusses in detail the scope
of these obligations in light of their effectiveness and legal
protection.
A. Implementing the Duty to Surrender
Pursuant to Article 88, a state party has a clear duty to ensure
that its national laws provide guidelines for handling requests for
arrest and surrender, and other forms of cooperation. This duty
arises even before a state party ever receives a request. 72 When
establishing the ICTY and ICTR, the Security Council was
concerned that the absence of national laws and procedures would
impair assistance and, therefore, impose a duty for the states to
enact, if necessary, laws allowing the provision of legal assistance. 73
The insertion of Article 88 in the ICC Statute is particularly
important because of certain references to domestic law and
procedures throughout the Statute. For example, pursuant to
Article 89(1), state parties shall comply with requests for arrest
and surrender in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 and the

70. This appears to be the prevailing view in cases before both the ICTR and ICTY.
See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, supra note 55, at 129; see also Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case
No. IT-94-2-PT,
111, 114 (2002) at http://www.un.org/icty/nikolic/trialc/decisione/10131553.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). Accord infra Part VI.B.
71. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
72. Unfortunately, the obligation only pertains to Part 9 and does not extend to other
Parts of the Statute. The obligation set out in Part 10 Article 109 of the ICC Statute can
enforce an order to freeze assets.
73. Compare S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) and S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/978 (1995) with S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 326th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993) and S.C. Res. 1207, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3944th mtg. $1-2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1207 (1998) (concerning the ICTR and ICTY, respectively). In the Blagkic
subpoena decision, the ICTY Trial Chamber emphasized that states are required to create
internal legislation that would enable them to fulfill their duty to comply with orders of
the Tribunal. Prosecutor v. Blagkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T 84 (1997) at http://www.un.org/
icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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procedure under their national law. Reading Article 89(l) in
conjunction with Article 88, it is clear that a state may not use the
absence of a domestic legal basis as an excuse for their failure to
comply with a surrender request.7 4 The scope of Article 88 does
not, however, go so far as to exclude domestic law as a general
ground for refusal, because the provision only obliges states to
have procedures available, and does not require they be effective.75
States are expected to implement Article 88 in good faith, like
any other obligation under the Statute. They should, however, be
given enough time to make the legislative changes at the national
level. Compared to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC
Statute offers far more guidance as to how the provision of
assistance is organised and, as a result, is much more informative
76
about the legislative steps to be taken.
B. Obstacles in the Implementation: The Duty to Consult
Before addressing the substantive content of the duty to
cooperate, especially the question of applicable grounds for
refusal, the procedural aspects of the duty to cooperate must first
be examined. For example, what are the obligations of a
requested state when it is confronted with a request for assistance
that it has determined it cannot implement? Adequate provisions
in this respect allow for misunderstandings to be eliminated and
alternative modes of cooperation considered.77
The procedures that a state must follow when it receives a
request for assistance that it has trouble complying with are more
specific under the ICC than under the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
States are under an explicit obligation to consult with the court
when problems arise which may impede the execution of the
request. The duty to consult, aiming at resolving "obstacles" in the

74. See Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 89, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1072, 1074-75.
75. For more detail, see SLUITER,supra note 17, at 194-97.
76. For an analysis of domestic laws implementing the ICTR and ICTY cooperation

regimes, see Goran Sluiter, ObtainingEvidence for the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia: An Overview and Assessment of Domestic Implementing
Legislation, 45 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 87, 87-113 (1998).
77. Bert Swart & Goran Sluiter, The International Criminal Court and International
Criminal Cooperation, in HERMAN A. M. VON HEBEL ET AL., REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS 91, 104

(Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking eds., 1999).
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provision of legal assistance, is prominent throughout Part 9 of the
ICC Statute.7 8 It is used several times with respect to specific
obligations to cooperate. It is also referred to more generally in
Article 97, which imposes upon states a duty to consult with the
Court with respect to every request for assistance issued under
Part 9 of the ICC Statute. If the state is unable to resolve the
matter after consulting with the court, Articles 87(7) and 119
provide that it is the duty of the court to determine how the state
should cooperate. This grant of power is a feature unique to the
vertical cooperation regime, as was already established above.79
The insertion of the duty to consult in the ICC Statute
suggests that states are not a priori prevented from submitting
grounds for refusal to the court for evaluation, even if these
grounds are not set out in the Statute. The language of Article 97
of the Statute supports this position. It contains an illustrative list
of obstacles that states may submit to the court. Thus the door is
opened to the submission of a variety of obstacles to the execution
of a request. 80
However, room to review the requests for assistance does not
exist when states are explicitly prohibited from reviewing or
refusing to comply with the requests for assistance. For example,
Article 59(4) of the ICC Statute provides that it is not open to the
competent authority of the state requested to arrest a person to
consider whether the arrest warrant was properly issued in
accordance with Article 58, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the ICC
Statute. A contrario, in other situations, the requested state may
submit obstacles that impede execution of the request. This
includes the objecting to the alleged ultra vires character of the
request. However, once these "obstacles" are not accepted by the
requesting court or Tribunal, the requested state is under an
obligation to give effect to the request.

78. Swart & Sluiter, supra note 77, at 103.
79. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
80. Article 97 has already been interpreted by the Netherlands as implying a certain
right to review requests for assistance in light of grounds other than those set out in the
Statute. This interpretation was, however, immediately followed by the determination that
in every cooperation dispute the court is the ultimate arbiter. See Dutch Cooperation Act,
TK, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 28 098 (R1704), no. 3, 7-9 (explanatory memorandum)
(translated into English by author).
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C. Grounds in the Statute to Refuse or PostponeSurrender
As a result of protracted and sometimes painful negotiations
between supporters and opponents of the far-reaching obligations
of the states to the court, specific grounds for refusal and
postponement of legal assistance were inserted into the ICC
Statute."'
Because the insertion of grounds for refusal and
postponement of assistance resulted from long and complex
negotiations, one may argue that, other than those provided in the
statute, no other grounds may be advanced by states to refuse or
postpone assistance. In other words, the ICC Statute is, as far as
the cooperation regime is concerned, a "self-contained regime,"
which should provide all the answers pertaining to the content of
the duty to cooperate. 8' Kress and Prost also believe that the very
careful determination of the scope of obligations to co-operate
during the Rome negotiations certainly points in this direction.83
However, this view does not conform to a systematic
interpretation of the Statute. The duty to consult, as set out in
Article 97 of the ICC Statute and as already examined in the
paragraph above, is not necessarily confined to problems of
implanting one of the grounds for refusal as set out in the Statute.
The drafters of the Statute, conducting the detailed and protracted
negotiations, could not have reasonably foreseen all the problems
that may occur in the practical application of the ICC legal
assistance regime.
1. Competing Requests
The drafters of the Statute were aware that certain requests
for assistance issued by the court might conflict with a state's other
international obligations. 84 In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals, the
ICC does not take priority over other international obligations,

81. For an account of the drafting history in this respect, see Mochochoko, supra note
8, at 310-14.
82. The concept of self-contained regimes came from the ICJ decision of United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980, I.C.J. 60, 3 (May 24).
The court held that the exclusive remedy for unlawful activities by diplomats is found in
International Law regarding diplomatic immunities, also considered a "self-contained
regime." Id. For more detail, see Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 1985 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 111-36.
83. See Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 87, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY

ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1055,1066.

84. See Mochochoko, supra note 8, at 314.
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such as that provided for in Article 103 of the UN Charter. As a
new international organisation, the ICC must be aware of and
respect the existing obligations of states under international law. If
this had not been the case, states would simply not have ratified
the Statute.
When obligations conflict, the guiding principle is that
priority should be given to the obligations under the Statute.
Furthermore, if the competing obligation is owed to another state
party, the obligation towards the court shall prevail.85
Article 90 of the Statute addresses the conflict between the
obligation to surrender and the obligation to extradite under a
treaty. It is an elaborate provision, proposing various solutions to
competing and irreconcilable requests for surrender. First, states
must notify the court of a competing request. If the competing
request comes from another state party, the request from the court
enjoys priority when the case has been declared admissible (see
Article 90 (2) of the ICC Statute). When the competing request
comes from a nonparty state, the requested state shall give priority
to the request from the court if the requested state has no
obligation under international law to comply with the competing
request (Article 90 (4) of the ICC Statute). However, if there is an
obligation towards the nonparty state, Article 90 ultimately leaves
it to the requested state to choose between the requests.86
One may wonder the extent to which competing extradition
obligations may be used as a tool to keep wanted war criminals out
of the hands of the court. Almost all extradition treaties contain
provisions on concurring extradition requests. These provisions
enable the requested state to make a choice between the various
requests. 7 Thus, states may give priority to the ICC to surrender
requests without much difficulty. Whether they are prepared to
surrender, however, is a different matter. One must applaud the
host state's position. If a requesting state categorically denies the

85. Under the ICC Statute, a state party may be absolved from complying with a
request for extradition coming from another state party.
86.

With respect to competing requests for surrender, this applies both to competing

requests based on crimes within the court's jurisdiction and to competing requests based
on other crimes. However, in making the decision whether or not to give priority to the

request of the court, the requested state is obliged to take into account all relevant factors,
including the respective dates of the requests, the interests of the requesting state and the
possibility of subsequent surrender to the court. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 68.
87. Swart, supra note 7, at 1697; see, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 8.
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jurisdiction of the court, then the Netherlands will give priority to
the request for surrender."'
2. Article 98: Immunities and Exclusive Jurisdiction
Article 98 of the ICC Statute, which was already alluded to in
Part III.B, provides that the court may not proceed with a request
for surrender or assistance that would require the requested state
to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law.
The state must respect a third state's diplomatic immunity. Article
98 arose out of the concern that a state should not be obliged to
act in breach of pre-existing obligations under international law.
Thus, it bears similarities to Article 90. Contrary to those
provisions, however, Article 98 limits the court from issuing a
request in the first place, because it may place a state in an
unacceptable position of conflict.
Article 98 of the ICC Statute, as a ground to refuse assistance,
recognises protections flowing from international obligations
Additionally, it
relating to diplomatic or state immunity.
recognises those obligations arising from an agreement, such as
Status of Forces agreements. These latter agreements provide
exclusive jurisdiction over troops stationed in another state. 90 In
situations when the court requests a state to surrender a
diplomatically immune prisoner, or a foreign soldier enjoying
protection from a Status of Forces agreement, it must seek waiver
of immunity. 91 The Article adopted this obligation to ensure that
the person is subject to the control of another state, and that state
does not have to choose between the sending state and the court.
Article 98 of the ICC Statute envisages that the court should
first seek to a obtain waiver of immunity from the third state
before issuing a request violating a state's immunity obligations.
Contrary to Article 90 of the ICC Statute, Article 98 does not
contain a provision that mandates a third state's obligation to
grant waiver of the immunity. This conflict would then be a matter
between two states parties and the court. For the Article's framers

88. See Dutch Cooperation Act, supra note 80, at 29.
89. Given its similarity to Article 90, it Article 98 is best examined in this section of
the Article.
90. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 6, at 78 (regulation of concurrent
jurisdiction conflicts).
91. Without such a waiver or consent, the requested state may refuse to execute a
request for arrest or surrender.
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to insert this type of provision would have appeared obvious. The
question of whether the third state has a duty to waive the
immunity, or to give the consent, is left to the duties of states
parties under Part 9.
An important element of Article 98 is that it leaves the court
to determine whether implementation of a request requires the
state to act inconsistently with its obligations in the field of state
and diplomatic immunities. In making that determination, the
court will not only subject itself to its own Statute, in particular
Article 27, but also to develop international law related to
diplomatic and state immunities. States nonparties are not bound
by Article 27 of the ICC Statute, but this provision reflects
customary international law. Heads of state do not enjoy state
immunity for the crimes within the court's jurisdiction. In the
ICTY decision on preliminary motions by Milogevic, the Trial
Chamber explicitly confirmed that customary international law
ensures that no person, in whatever official capacity, enjoys
immunity before an international tribunal when he or she is
accused of the most serious international crimes.92 Also, the recent
judgement by the ICJ in the Congo-Belgium case acknowledges, in
my view, that current international law for state and diplomatic
immunities are not applicable to arrests and surrenders at the
request of the ICC. 93
The use of Article 98 as a possible ground for refusal has
recently received a lot of attention. In a campaign to keep its
nationals out of the hands of the court, the United States intends
to conclude a number of treaties with ICC states parties that
require consent from the requested person's national states before
that person may be surrendered to the ICC.94 By concluding such

92. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milogevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Case No. IT99-37-PT, T. Ch. III, 8 Nov. 2001, paras. 26-34.
93. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium), Feb. 14, 2002, para. 61, (an acting Minister of Foreign Affairs may be
subjected to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, including
the ICC regardless of whether the individual is a high state official of party states or
nonparty states), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last
visited Sept. 21, 2003).
94. The most relevant provisions of the Article 98(2) agreements state:
For purposes of this agreement, "persons" are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of
one Party.
Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
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agreements, the United States hopes to trigger the application of
Article 98 (2), and prevent the court from proceeding with a
request for surrender without U.S. permission. It is unclear,
however, whether the agreements will produce the desired result
and the court considers them to bar the issuance of the request for
surrender. One argument the court is considering is that only the
existing obligations of states parties fall within the scope of
application of Article 98 (2). 95
3. Ne-bis-in-idem
Ne-bis-in-idem (double jeopardy) is not truly a ground to
refuse surrender to the court. Whether or not the arrested person
has already been diligently tried by another court for conduct
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which is the basis for the arrest
warrant and surrender request, is a matter best left to the court
pursuant to Article 20 of the Statute. Thus, when the requested
person submits a ne-bis-in-idem claim to the competent domestic
court, the requested state, pursuant to Article 89(2) of the Statute,
shall immediately consult with the court. The court and state shall
determine the admissibility of the case. Pending the admissibility
ruling, the requested
state may postpone the execution of the
96
surrender request.
4. Postponing the Request for Surrender
The ICC Statute explicitly allows the requested state to
postpone the provision of legal assistance under certain conditions.
This is not the same as a ground for refusing assistance. The latter,
expressed consent of the first Party, be surrendered or transferred by any means
to the International Criminal court for any purpose, or be surrendered or
transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a
third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to the International
Criminal court.
95. See Prost & Schlunck, supra note 53, at 1132. Article 98(2) is similar to Article
90(6) which provides that a party state's duty to comply with other obligations can only be
used as a ground to refuse its surrender of an individual if the obligation is under an
existing extradition treaty. ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 75. Furthermore, treaties that
have the sole purpose of keeping individuals out of the reach of the court amount to a
violation of the overall duty to cooperate with the court in good faith and therefore will
not to be taken into account. Also, Article 98(2) explicitly refers to a party state's
obligations towards a "sending state". As a result, only obligations to send certain
individuals, such as military troops and diplomats, to another state are envisaged., Treaties
including every U.S. national, however, exceed the scope of Article 98(2).
96. See discussion infra Part V.C.4.
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if accepted by the court, is final. The former, however, may
temporarily suspend the duty to provide assistance. It regains its
force when the "conditions of postponement" are no longer
applicable. The difference between refusal and postponement may
only be marginal in practice, particularly if it concerns a request
that begs for swift execution. 9 The main ground for refusal
addresses the right to postpone legal services.
The grounds for postponement have one positive effect for
effective legal assistance. To the extent it was not already apparent
on the basis of other provisions, it underlines that the "general
rule" is immediate execution of requests, and postponement is the
exception. 98
Article 95 of the ICC Statute allows a state to postpone the
execution of a request pending the determination by the court of
the case's admissibility pursuant to Article 18 or 19 of the Statute.
The provision puts the principle of complementarily into effect.
According to this principle, prosecution should take place at the
national level and the court may only exercise jurisdiction if a state
is unwilling or unable to prosecute a case. According to Article 95,
until it is certain that the court may actually exercise jurisdiction,
there is no need to assist the court.
With respect to the duty to surrender persons in addition to
Article 95, there are two special provision in Articles 89 and 90.
Article 89(2) dealing with requests for arrest and surrender,
provides that "[i]f an admissibility ruling is pending, the requested
state may postpone the execution of the request for surrender of
the person until the court makes a determination on admissibility."
Furthermore, Article 90(2), which deals with competing surrender
requests, provides that priority must be given to a request from the
court, only after the case has been declared admissible. Prior to
that declaration, a state can choose to give effect to the competing
request from another state.
Article 94 of the Statute allows a state to postpone the
execution of any request for assistance if immediate execution
would interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution. This
97. The "postponement solution" was the result of a compromise between
delegations that favored a material ground for refusal and those that did not. See
Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 95, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1123; see also Swart & Sluiter, supra note 77, at 107.

98. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 73 (referring to immediate execution).
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provision was initially envisaged as a ground for refusal, but now it
is a ground for postponement. 99 The provision recognises the
interests of states to protect their domestic investigations and
prosecutions. However, if domestic interests in investigations and
prosecutions, concern the commission of "ordinary crimes," they
are of such a weight as to postpone the provision of legal
assistance.
D. Applicability of Other Grounds for Refusal
Under Article 97, state parties to the ICC cannot be
prevented from submitting to the court by obstacles other than
those explicitly set out in the Statute when requesting for arrest
and surrender. Whether they will be recognised by the court on a
justified ground is a different matter. The guiding principle should
be the one enunciated by the Appeals Chamber in the Blagkic
subpoena case. The requesting tribunal, or court, should be
mindful of legitimate state concerns. " These legitimate concerns,
if they bar the provision of the assistance sought in every way, are
to be balanced against the interests of the requesting tribunal, or
court, to obtain the assistance. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY
stated in the Blakic subpoena case, referring to national security
grounds for refusal:
In assessing the merits of an objection, the International
Tribunal must consider two fundamental interests, the interest
in upholding the national security interest of a state and the
interest in gaining access to the evidence critical to the
prosecution or defence in cases relating to serious violations of
international humanitarian law.' 0'
A number of factors are relevant to this balancing exercise,
including whether assistance may be provided in other ways and
99. Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 94: Postponement of Execution of a
Request in Respect of Ongoing Investigation or Prosecution, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES,
ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1119.
100. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blalkic, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, in ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, ALC-I-245 (Andre
Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
101. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blalkic, Decision on the Objection of the Republic of
Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T. Ch. II, 18
July 1997, para. 149, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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has generally cooperated in good faith with the
whether the state
1 2
requesting court.

Concerning the invoked ground for refusal, the question as to
its legitimacy and its weight, compared to the requesting court, is
of the utmost importance. The interest of the court in obtaining
the surrender of the requested person, whose presence is required
to commence the trial, is a competing state interest of greater
weight than probably any other refusal ground not in the Statute.
Nevertheless, a number of grounds for refusal will be
examined below. The question of legitimacy and weight will be
addressed, in the light of the particular nature of the ICC and the
legal assistance relationship with these institutions. These grounds
for refusal are traditionally used in the extradition framework.
1. Nature of the Offence: Political and Military Offence Exception
Grounds for refusal that based on the type of offence in
extradition law include the "political, military or fiscal offence"
exception. Given the nature of the crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction, the fiscal offence exception need not be examined. It
is, however, worth exploring whether requested states considered
the crimes within its jurisdiction as political and military offences
and whether they have a legitimate interest in refusing assistance
on that basis.
"Military offences" can be defined as acts "punishable only as
a violation of military law or regulation, and which would not be
punishable as a violation of a civil law or regulation if the military
law or regulation did not apply.

They are grounds for refusal in

several extradition treaties. 4 Although the offences within the
court's jurisdiction may amount to a violation of domestic military
codes, they are seldom only punishable as a violation of military
law. Therefore, they can not be considered offences of an essential
military character.' 5
102. Cf. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blagkic, supra note 100.
103. Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition, art. 6, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 22
(1933); see Kenneth J. Harris & Robert Kushen, Surrender of Fugitives to the War Crimes
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Squaring International Legal Obligations with the
U.S. Constitution,7 Crim. L.F., 561, 571 (1996).
104. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 4.
105. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES

LAW AND PRACTICE 583 (3d ed. 1996) (arguing that the military offence exception cannot
be applied when the charged acts constitute a crime under the ordinary laws of the
requesting state and amount to war crimes); cf.Harris & Kushen, supra note 103, at 571
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"Political offences" are of two types. The first category is
"purely" political offences, which are exclusively directed against
the state or political entity and are not accompanied by the
commission of common crimes. The second category is "related"
political offences, which are common crimes having a "political"
element, being committed for a political purpose, out of a political
motive, or the "political consequences" of the crime."" It is
standard in extradition treaties that the requested state may refuse
extradition for political offences."" Especially with "related"
political offences, every crime within the jurisdiction of the court
could potentially be considered a political offence.0 8 The whole
concept of international crimes, based on the civitas maxima
theory is that they should not remain unpunished, is that it is
difficult to reconcile with the limitations on international
cooperation on account of the political offence exception. This has
resulted in the development of explicit exceptions to the political
offence exception in certain international instruments relating to
extradition in particular. 0 9 As far as war crimes are concerned,
however, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocols do not exclude war crimes from the political offence
realm. "0 Consequently, the political offence exception could still
be applied to war crimes."' The ICTY Appeals Chamber, in the
Tadic jurisdiction case, has, however, come to a different
conclusion: "Crimes against the laws and customs of war cannot be
considered political offences, as they do not harm a political
(arguing that the character of all offences could be considered either political or military if
those terms are interpreted broadly).
106. See DR. CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 106,108 (1980); see also
Harris & Kushen, supra note 103, at 571. "Related political crimes" is extremely wide and
includes treason, espionage and conspiracy. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 105, at 515-18.
107. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 3; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note
105, at 504 (examples of political offence exceptions to extradition treaties to which the
United States is a party).
108. See Harris & Kushen, supra note 103, at 571.
109. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, U.N. GAOR Res. 260 A (III), Dec. 9, 1948, art. 7, 78 U.N.T.S. 278, 282 (stating
that genocide "shall not be considered a political offence for the purposes of extradition");
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, Oct. 15 1975, art. 1(a),
Europ. T.S. No. 86 (providing that crimes against humanity, as discussed in the Genocide
Convention, will not be considered political crimes for the purpose of extradition).
110. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 106. at 143.
111. See id.
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interest of a particular state, nor a political right of a particular

citizen."' 12 In the FurundZija case, the Trial Chamber has reached
the same conclusion with respect to torture."' It can be concluded
that the ICTY does not consider the crimes within its jurisdiction
as political offences, or that the political offence exception may be
invoked as a bar to extradition. It may thus also not be invoked as
a ground to refuse surrender to the court.
Even if the political offence exception may be invoked to bar
extradition for war crimes, it is not a legitimate obstacle to
surrender war criminals to the ICC due to the underlying
rationales. First, the exception is based on the court's desire to
distance itself from the political conflicts in other states.' 14 Second,
the exception is also linked to the idea that some morally
reprehensible acts are justified by the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the acts. "5 Finally, the exception is justified by
the greater risk that political offenders will receive an unfair
trial.
Because the ICC is an impartial and independent
international criminal tribunal, the rationales listed above do not
apply. Thus, the political offence exception should not bar the
prosecution of war criminals by the ICC.
2. Double Criminality Requirement
Double criminality is a fundamental requirement of
international extradition law. It requires that the act for which
extradition is requested be a criminal offence in both the
requesting and requested state.1 7 The requirement is found in

112. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, ALC-I-33 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
113. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, T. Ch. II, 10 Dec.
1998, para. 57, International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia.
114. Bert Swart, Refusal of Extradition and the United Nations Model Treaty on

Extradition,1992 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L., 175, 182.
115. Id. at 182-83.
116. Id. at 183.
117. Bert Swart, Extradition, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
NETHERLANDS 85, 96 (Bert Swart & Andre Klip eds., 1997). There are three approaches
to determine whether the charged offence, even though criminal in both states, falls within
the scope of the double criminality requirement. First, the act is chargeable in both states
as a criminal offence regardless of whether it the individual can be prosecuted. Second,
the act is chargeable and an individual may be prosecuted in both states. Third, the act is
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practically every extradition treaty as a general limit on what is an
extraditable offence.'18
Because the international criminal tribunals and member
states have a cooperation relationship, the double criminality
requirement is not a legitimate ground for a state to refuse an
extradition request for two reasons-the principles of reciprocity
and legality.
First, the requirement derives its "right of existence" in the
first Place from the principle of legality. This principle implies that
a state can only invoke its own laws of criminal procedure when
the conduct underlying the request for assistance is a crime in that
state. It is unreasonable to suggest that a state should afford
stricter standards of procedures to foreign crimes, especially in
respect to compulsory measures such as arrest, than the
procedures

for

domestic

criminal

crimes. " 9

Second,

the

requirement is based on the principle of reciprocity in
international cooperation in criminal matters. When an act is
criminal in both the requesting and requested state, it is possible
for the requesting state to ask for assistance.2
Thus, as discussed above in Part II.C.2, states and the ICC
have a cooperation relationship, which is not based on reciprocity.
Thus, the double criminality requirement is not a legitimate
ground to refuse an extradition request.
Regarding the most important underlying reason of the
double criminality requirement, being the principle of legality, one
should bear in mind the particular and limited subject matter
jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, the crimes over which the ICC
has jurisdiction are crimes that any state may exercise jurisdiction
12 1
under general international law, or the universality principle.
Further, a state may have treaty obligations that require it to
penalise the crime under its domestic laws. Finally, states must
faithfully implement the ICC crimes within their own criminal
legislation based on the principle of complementarily. Thus,

chargeable, the individual may be prosecuted, and convicted in both states. BASSIOUNI,
supra note 105, at 389-90.
118. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 5; U.N. Model Treaty, supra note
5, at 4.
119. See KARL-FRIEDRICH NAGEL, BEWEISAUFNAHME IM AUSLAND 98 (1988).
120. Id. at 219.
121. Cf Harris & Kushen, supra note 103, at 573.
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failure to do so can not be an acceptable basis for refusing
assistance. 22
3. Immunity from Prosecution Under Domestic Law: Lapse of
Time and Amnesty
Closely related to the double criminality requirement is the
ability of a state to refuse to extradite an individual because the
person is immune from domestic prosecution due to a grant of
amnesty or lapse of time since the commission of the crime.
The lapse of a statute of limitation is a ground for refusal to
surrender individuals in almost every extradition treaty.' 23 The
rationale for this exception is that society's interest in prosecuting
criminals diminishes over time. At issue is whether statutes of
limitations apply to all offences, including international crimes.
Under customary international law, states are obligated not to
apply statutes of limitations to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 124 Furthermore, crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction are
not subject to any statute of limitations. Therefore, according to
the ICC, the running of any statute of limitations is an illegitimate
ground to refuse extradition.
The issue of amnesty is more complicated. Treaty practice has
recognised amnesty as a ground to refuse extradition. ' It is
unclear, however, if amnesty is a ground for refusal in the ICC.
The issue of whether amnesty should be a ground for refusal
touches upon the very purpose of the court, namely putting an end
to impunity for international crimes. Strictly speaking, the issue of
amnesty, like the defense of ne-bis-in-idem, appears to concern the

122. See id.; see also Swart, supra note 7, at 1682.
123. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 5, at 4; U.N. Model Treaty, supra note
5.
124. Two treaties expressly state this obligation but they are not widely ratified. See
Universal Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73;
European Convention on the Non Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82. The French Cour
de Cassation explicitly mentions in the Barbie case that the prohibition on statutory
limitations is now part of customary law. F~ddration Nationale des Ddportds et Intern6s
R6sistants et. al. v. Barbie, (1984) 78 I.L.R. 125, 135. Furthermore, the prohibition is
codified in Article 29 of the ICC Statute and in Principle 6 of the Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction.
125. See, e.g., U.N. Model Treaty, supra note 5, at 5.
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admissibility of the case. 116 Neither the Statute nor the ICC
regulations on admissibility address the question of amnesty.
Arguably, crimes within the court's jurisdiction are so serious that
amnesty could never constitute a bar to prosecution. 27 On the
other hand, the prosecution of individuals who have been granted
amnesty by independent and impartial truth and reconciliation
commissions may not serve the interests of justice and may have
grave political consequences. Under the Statute, the prosecutor
may decide not to start an investigation if an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice. This could include amnesties
granted by truth and reconciliation commissions.1 28 If the
Prosecutor decides to start an investigation, however, a state may
be confronted with a request for surrender. Such a request would
require the state to violate amnesties granted under domestic law.
It is possible that under such circumstances the court would find a
legitimate ground for refusal, thereby exercising an indirect review
of the prosecutor's decision to investigate. In determining whether
amnesty is a legitimate ground for refusal, the court could look to
the criteria under Article 20 (3) of the Statute, as guiding
principles, relating to ne-bis-in-idem defenses.
4. Non-Extradition/Surrender of Nationals
In international extradition law, the non-extradition of
nationals is a common ground for refusal, although civil law states
follow this rule much more frequently than common law states.121
In certain civil law states, the rule of non-extradition of nationals
has constitutional status. 30 One can discern, however, a trend
toward a more flexible interpretation of the non-extradition of
nationals rule. For example, certain states may extradite their
nationals on the condition that the nationals serve their sentences
in the requested state. 3

126. Amnesties, however, do not fall within the scope of Article 20 of the ICC Statute.
See Dr. Christine Van den Wijngaert & Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including
the Issue of Amnesty, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 726-27 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
127. See Gerhard Hafner et al., A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth
Wedgwood, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 109, 112 (1999).
128. Id.
129. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 105, at 588.
130. E.g., F. R.YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 17; F.R.G. CONsT. art. 16.
131. E.g., Dutch Extradition Act, supra note 80, art. 4(2).
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As previously mentioned, the issue of non-extradition of
nationals was at the heart of the distinction between extradition
and surrender.132 The majority of delegations, with good reason,
prevented the insertion of a ground in the Statute that would allow
1 33
a state to refuse the surrender of its nationals to the court.
Indeed, it would undermine the court's ability to function
effectively because every state party would have the possibility of
preventing the surrender of its nationals by diligently prosecuting
them internally.13
5. Human Rights Related Grounds for Refusal
Human rights play an increasingly important role in
extradition. Many extradition treaties include a variety of grounds
for refusal to extradite that seem inspired by the protection of
human rights. These grounds may be concerned with certain
particular inhuman treatment that awaits the requested person in
the requesting
state 135 with the nature of the penalty in case of
• • 136
conviction, with the quality of the trial awaiting the arrested
person,137 or with the quality of the trial constituting the basis for
conviction and the requested extradition.13 ' Additionally,
obligations under human rights treaties increasingly play a role in
the extradition process, including the decision to grant extradition
requests. Human rights impeding surrender would certainly
amount to legitimate state concern because the ICC itself is bound
to observe, on a priority basis, internationally protected human
rights.139 Given the importance of the matter, the relationship of

132. See discussion supra Part II.A.
133. For an account of the debate, see Mochochoko, supranote 8, at 311-12.
134. See Swart, supra note 7, at 1683.
135. U.N. Model Treaty, supra note 5, at 5 (mentioning torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment).
136. Id. (refusing extradition in case of the likely imposition of the death penalty); see
European Convention, supra note 5, at 7.
137. U.N. Model Treaty, supra note 5, at 5 (prohibiting surrender if a person receives a
trial in violation of the fundamental guarantees of Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Extradition will also not be granted if it is
requested for the purpose of discriminatory prosecution. See id.
138. The U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition prohibits extradition if the requested
person has not received a fair trial pursuant to Article 14 of the ICCPR. If there has been
a trial in absentia and the requested person is not entitled to a new trial after being
extradited, then Article 3 (g) of the U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition applies. See id.
139. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, at 20.
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human rights on the surrender process will be examined in its own
right in the next section.
E. Conditions of Surrender: The Rule of Speciality
According to Article 101 of the ICC Statute, the court shall
not proceed against any person surrendered to the court for any
conduct committed prior to surrender. The court may only
institute proceedings for the conduct which forms the basis of the
crimes for which that person has been surrendered. This rule,
known in extradition law as the rule of speciality, cannot serve as a
ground to refuse surrender. Rather, it imposes conditions on the
legal consequences of surrender. The justification and purpose of
the rule is to enforce the limitations and restrictions as set forth in
extradition treaties. Otherwise, the limitations and restrictions
laid down in extradition treaties would make little sense if the
requesting state, after obtaining a person's surrender, could try the
person for offences for which extradition has been refused
or for
140
requested.
been
not
has
extradition
which
offences for
In light of its purpose in extradition law, it is puzzling why the
rule of speciality has been incorporated in the ICC surrender
regime. The ICC surrender regime is clearly distinct from
extradition law because the extradition restrictions and limitations
that the speciality rule purports to protect are not applicable.' 4' In
other words, why prohibit prosecution for other conduct if a state
party would be under a practically absolute duty to surrender for
that conduct as well? Taking account of the particular surrender
duties, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has logically declared the rule
of speciality not applicable. 42
It is possible that the purpose of Article 101 is to protect the
interests of nonparty states with respect to surrender pursuant to
an ad hoc cooperation agreement or after the ad hoc acceptance of
jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 12 (3) of the Statute. In
these situations the duty of the nonparty state to surrender, if any,
is confined to the conduct agreed upon in the ad hoc cooperation

140. Swart, supra note 7, at 1698.
141. Id. at 1699-1700: see also Peter Wilkitzki, Article 101 in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES,

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 3, at 1147-50.
142. Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, No. IT-97-24-AR73, para. 37, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
kovacevic/appeal/decision-e/80702ms3.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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agreement or the crime for which the state accepted jurisdiction.
The rule of speciality then serves to ensure that the court seeks
the
143
required consent for the prosecution of any other conduct.
The second paragraph of Article 101 deals with requesting
and obtaining a waiver of the speciality condition. The provision
contains ambiguous language regarding whether state parties have
a duty to waive the rule of specialty. The last sentence stipulates
that "states Parties shall have the authority to provide a waiver to
the court and should endeavour to do so." The words "endeavour
to do so" imply that states parties have no obligation under the
Statute to provide the waiver. A bar to extending the prosecution
to other conduct is in clear contradiction with the mandatory
nature of the surrender obligations.'"
Article 101 applies only to prosecution by the court itself. It
is surprisingly silent as to the re-extradition/surrender to a third
state, to which the rule of speciality should apply. Instead, Rule
185 of the Draft Rules is controlling. According to Paragraph 1 of
this provision, a released person may only be transferred to a third
state for 1•the .purpose
of prosecution with the consent of the
_
145
surrendering state.
VI. SURRENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS

National courts should serve as the first protectors of the
individual rights of arrested persons, with the ICC serving an
important supervisory role. However, there are other human
rights dimensions to the surrender process, other than those
discussed in Part V.D.v. above. The present Part of this article
deals with two of them. The first is whether human rights
violations after the surrender may, or even should, affect the

143. The rules of specialty in ad hoc cooperation agreements or ad hoc acceptance of
jurisdiction could be part of an agreement between the court and the requested state.
Swart, supra note 7, at 1700-01.
144. See Wilkitzki, supra note 141, at 1155 (criticizing that this limitation is a step
backward in relation to certain interstate extradition developments).
145. The ICTY and ICTR Rules contain a similar regulation. See ICTY AND ICTR
RULES, supra note 3, at 233. Even in absence of this Rule, transfer of an individual whose
indictment was withdrawn to a state for prosecution other than the state of arrest is
unlawful according to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
But see
Prosecutor v. Ntuyhaga, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw the Indictment,
Case No. ICTR-98-40-T, T. Ch. 1, 18 March 1999, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

FOR RWANDA1994-1999 ALC-II-106 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 1999).
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surrender decision of the national court. The second issue is
whether alternatives to surrender, namely abductions and forms of
"disguised surrender" such as expulsions, are legal in light of
international human rights laws.
A. Treatment After Surrender
Part V.D.v above alluded that the treatment of persons upon
extradition, especially human rights violations, may compel a state
to refuse the requested surrender. Under international human
rights law, a state may be held liable if there are reasonable
grounds to foresee that a serious violation of human rights will
occur in a state and if the state, in spite of this likelihood,
surrenders an individual to that state. 146 This rule, as established in
ICC. 47
the Soering jurisprudence, also applies in principle to the
As a result, the same two questions pertaining to extradition law
must be addressed again. First, to what extent should a state
abandon the traditional rule of inquiry and form an opinion as to
the quality of the ICC proceedings? Second, which human rights
violations within the ICC proceedings possibly constitute a bar to
surrender?
1. Rule of Non-Inquiry
The non-inquiry rule prevents a judicial inquiry into the
fairness of the judicial procedures and the penal conditions in the
requesting state and is traditionally a strong tenet of extradition
law. This rule is justified by the fact, inter alia, that judges are illequipped to examine foreign legal systems and that there is
sovereign equality between states. This explains the reluctance to

146. This has been established by the supervisory bodies to both the ECHR and
ICCPR in the cases of Soering and Ng. Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. of H.R.,
Judgement of 7 July 1989, Series A, Vol 161, para. 91; Ng v. Canada, Comm. No. 469/1991,
5 Nov. 1993, 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 161, 168 (1994). There are many articles and
commentaries on these decisions and their important consequences. See SUSANNE
ZUHLKE & JENS-CHRISTIAN PASTILLE, EXTRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION: SOERING REVISITED 749-84 (1999); Harmen G. van der Wilt & Apr~s
Soering, The Relationship Between Extradition and Human Rights in the Legal Practiceof
Germany: The Netherlands and the United States, 42 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 53 (1995); see
generally Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. OF INT'L L. 85 (1992).

147. This has been explicitly acknowledged by the Dutch government in the
explanatory memorandum to the Dutch Cooperation Act and in the parliamentary debate
on that act. Dutch Cooperation Act, supra note 80, at 7, 21.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:605

pass judgement on the quality of another state's criminal
proceedings. 4 8 Furthermore, the freely negotiated "cooperation"
treaty reflects confidence in the foreign criminal justice system, 14a9
system that has been shaped through a long course of history.
Hence, there would be no further need to question the requesting
state's proceedings.
Perhaps more so than in a "horizontal" cooperation
relationship, the ICTY and ICTR surrender practices demonstrate
that national courts are inclined to maintain the rule of noninquiry in relation to international criminal tribunals.
In
Ntakirutimana, the accused challenged his transfer from the
United States to the ICTR, inter alia, on the ground that "the
ICTR is incapable of protecting his due process rights."15 The
majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
declined to consider this ground based on the rule of noninquiry. 51
The rule of non-inquiry is an element of extradition law that
should not be applied to surrender proceedings by analogy. As
established above, the legal framework of the ICC, especially
Article 97 of the Statute does not prevent states from reviewing
requests for assistance. In addition, states are not prevented from
passing judgment upon the general quality of the proceedings
before the court. The court is an international organisation, but it
is not subject to the human rights international supervisory
mechanisms.152 Finally, the rule of non-inquiry is based on the
assumption that the freely negotiated extradition treaty reflects
confidence in the long-standing foreign criminal justice system.
However, newer institutions such as the ICC must "earn" this
confidence, in spite of the safeguards provided by the legal
framework.
By far, the most compelling reason why the rule of noninquiry cannot be maintained lies in the human rights treaty
obligations.
The "Soering and Ng jurisprudence" does not

148. Shea, supra note 145, at 93.
149. John Dugard & Christine Van den Wijngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.187, 189-90 (1989).
150. Ntakirutimana, v. Reno,184 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 1999).
151. Id.
152. See Andr6 Klip, The Decrease of Protection under Human Rights Treaties in
InternationalCriminal Law, 68 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 291, 291-310 (1997) (criticizing how

the ICC is not subject to the human rights international supervisory mechanisms).
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distinguish between human rights violations following extradition
and other forms of transfer, such as expulsion, deportation, and
surrender. 153
2. Possible Post-Surrender Human Rights Violations
Exploring possible situations in which human rights might
constitute a bar to surrender to the court is an academic exercise
and very speculative. The ICC Statute appears to offer all the
necessary safeguards during the pre-trial, trial, and sentence
execution phases. 5 4 It is an improvement from the ICTY and
ICTR legal frameworks, which raised human rights concerns,
especially during the sentencing phases.'55
Given the foregoing, it may be difficult to imagine a situation
in which the Soering jurisprudence may prevent surrender to the
court. In fact, pursuant to the ECHR and ICCPR, state parties
may only refuse to extradite, expel or surrender if the individual
faces serious risks of human rights violations, such as cruel,
inhuman or de rading treatment or punishment or flagrant fair
trial violations.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Naletilic's
Complaint challenging his surrender from Croatia to the ICTY on
the basis of the Soering jurisprudence was denied. 57

153. This has also been acknowledged by the Dutch government. See Dutch
Cooperation Act, supra note 80. This has been explicitly acknowledged by the Dutch
government in the explanatory memorandum to the Dutch Cooperation Act and in the
course of the parliamentarian debate on that act. Id. at 7, 21.
154. Note again the important gap-filling function of Article 21(3) of the Statute
providing that the application and interpretation of the Statute and Rules must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights.
155. Upon ratifying the ICTR, Belgium included a reservation to its obligation to
provide assistance and the enforcement of prison sentences in Rwanda where the rights of
the detained persons are grossly violated. See Belgium Legislation, art. 13, 1996 Y.B.
INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 247. This provision arose mainly
from the concern that the imposition of prison sentences would not meet the ECHR
standards. This was not an imaginary concern considering that Article 26 of the ICTR
Statute delegates an important role in enforcing prison sentences to Rwanda. See the
legislative history of the Belgian implementing law, S~nat de Belgique, Session de 1995 1996, Projet de loi rlative d la coopdration judiciaire avec le Tribunal internationalpour
l'ex-Yougoslavie et le Tribunal internationalpour le Rwanda, 1-247/3, at 82. In practice,
however, the ICTY and ICTR confirm that sentences are only enforced in states that are
able to protect the basic rights of the detained person.
156. For an overview of the rights that obstruct extradition, see Dugard & Van den
Wijngaert, supra note 149, at 195-205.
157. Naletilic v. Croatia, supra note 68. The ICTY court ruled that "[it] offers all the
necessary guarantees including those of impartiality and independence."
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It would go too far, however, to categorically exclude the
possibility of the "Soering ground for refusal" in relation to
international criminal proceedings. The proof of the pudding will,
as always, be in the eating. The fact that a state has never withheld
the surrender to the ICTY and ICTR on this ground does not
mean that the proceedings of the latter are in full conformity with
international human rights law. An incidental court ruling that
may be at odds with human rights obligations, such as granting full
anonymity to witnesses,"" is not the greatest concern. However,
the same cannot be said of extremely long periods of pre-trial
detention, which seem to be the rule rather than the exception
with the ICTY and ICTR.
B. Alternatives to Surrender:Abduction and "Disguised
Surrender"
The use of extradition alternatives to obtain custody of an
alleged offender is highly controversial under international law.
Alternative methods vary from the use of national immigration
laws resulting in expulsion orders, "disguised extradition," to the
brutal abduction of the wanted person from the territory of
another state.
Both disguised extradition and abductions are
generally considered violations of the right to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention.' 60 Furthermore, abduction
performed by state officials also violates the sovereignty of
another state. Other national courts have accepted forms of
disguised extradition and abduction as lawful. For example, the
French Cour de Cassation in the Barbie case recognised disguised
extradition as lawful in relation to crimes against humanity, where

158. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. Ch. II (1995) in
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999,

ALC-I-55 (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001).
159. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 105, at 167-216, 217-94.

For more detail see the

Chapters on disguised extradition and abduction.
160. 'Disguised extradition' has been considered a violation of Article 5 ECHR. See
Bozano v. France, 111 EUR. Cr. OF H.R. (Ser. A) (1986). The Human Rights Committee

has ruled on several occasions that cross-border abductions violate Article 9 of the
ICCPR. See Francesco Cavallaro (alleged victim's legal representative) on behalf of
Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 056/1979, Views of 29 July 1981, and
Edgar A. Canon Garcia v. Ecuador, Comm. No. 319/1988, Views of 5 Nov. 1991.

2003]

Surrender of War Criminals to the ICC

the "ordinary extradition rules do not apply."' 61 However, these
courts have failed to review these alternative methods in light of
international human rights laws.'62
The ICC, as any other court, may be tempted to benefit from
an alternative means of obtaining custody over wanted persons,
especially if they are accused of the most serious crimes. However,
as an international body, it would be unthinkable for the court not
to label certain forms of "disguised extradition" and abduction as
unlawful human rights violations. However, case law from the
ICTY and ICTR suggests that these courts do not hesitate with
regards to this matter.16 ' The focus, therefore, should be on the
consequences of "disguised extradition" and abductions. There
has always been, and remains to be, abundant scholarly debate on
the mala captus bene detentus doctrine. This doctrine enables a

court to exercise jurisdiction even over an individual who has been
unlawfully arrested or detained.'6 Considerable reluctance to the
release of wanted criminals is understandable, especially if they

are accused of the most serious crimes.

However, to preserve

their own integrity and credibility as the guardians of human
rights, with the aim of securing state cooperation for future trials,
the ICTY and ICTR have rejected the doctrine of releasing
criminals. As such the ICTY and ICTR, thereby acknowledge that

161. F~dration nationale des d~port~s et intern6s r6sistants et al. v. Barbie, (1984) 78
I.L.R. 125 (1984).
162. The most notorious example is the abduction of Alvarez-Machain from Mexico
by individuals paid by U.S. law enforcement officials. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655 (1992). Many commentaries have appeared within and outside the United
states. See, e.g., Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered. The Jurisdictional
Nihilism of the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 1209 (1994); Analisa W. Scrimger, United states v. Alvarez-Machain: Forcible
Abduction as an Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaining Jurisdiction,7 TEMP. INT'L &

CoMP. L. J. 369, 369-93 (1993).
163. See Prosecutor v. Mrklic and others, Decision on the Motion for Release by the
Accused Slavko Dokmanovic, Case No. 95-13a-PT, T.Ch. II (1997) in ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1997-1999, ALC-III-127 (Andre

Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001). In this decision, the ICTY Trial Chamber, unlike the
French Cour de Cassation in the Barbie case, did not make an exception for international
crimes. Instead, the trial chamber recognized the unlawful character of certain methods of
arrest and surrender.
164. In relation to the international criminal tribunals, see Michael P. Scharf, The
Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic: IrregularRendition and the ICTY, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L

L. 369 (1998); Lamb, supra note 69, at 167-244.
165. Scharf proposes an "Eichmann exception" for international crimes, which would
make the mala captus bene detentus doctrine. Scharf, supra note 164, at 381.
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an individual unlawfully arrested or detained shall be entitled to
legal remedies.166
In the Nikolic decision, however, the Trial
Chamber held that terminating the proceedings and the
subsequent release of the accused, will only be an appropriate
remedy if at least one, but preferably two, of the following
conditions are met: (1) the Tribunal, especially the prosecutor,
was involved in the unlawful arrest or detention; or (2) the
unlawful arrest or detention is particularly egregious, such as
serious mistreatment of the accused.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since the ICC is still far from truly operational, it is too early
to judge whether the ICC surrender model is for efficacy and
fairness reasons.
However, the effectiveness of the proposed
surrender scheme can be evaluated in two ways. In general, the
ICC surrender regime is weaker than that of the ICTY and ICTR.
With respect to surrender, one should mention that the weak
points of the ICC Statute are the inflexible regulations on the
issuance and transmission of requests, the insertion of the rule of
speciality, the possibilities of postponing the provision of
assistance, and the considerable role attributed to national law
concerning the execution of requests. The difference in the way
the law was established is the major reason why the ICC
cooperation law is weaker. The ad hoc tribunals were established
with limited mandate. As a result of their swift creation, the
Tribunals, especially the judges themselves, created much of the
law. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the judges have opted
for what is, in their eyes, the most effective cooperation regime.
On the other hand, the establishment of the ICC by treaty
triggered protracted rounds of negotiations, which soon revealed
that participating states were not prepared to have the institution
shape its own laws in any way. Since the shaping of the legal
assistance regime was left to the participating states, the resulting
compromise left the system significantly weaker on a number of
points.16 ' From the perspective of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC
166. See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, supra note 56; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, supra note
70.
167. One could also look at the ICC cooperation regime from a different perspective
than that of the ad hoc tribunals. Compared to the recently created or proposed
"internationalized tribunals" of Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia, which
were alluded to in, the introduction, the ICC is still a potentially powerful institution.

2003]

Surrenderof War Criminalsto the ICC

651

cooperation model is disappointing.
In addition, from the
perspective of interstate cooperation in criminal matters, one
cannot but be satisfied. Bearing in mind the likelihood that several
states with no interest in a strong court participated in the
negotiations, it is a significant achievement that the ICC surrender
regime is still of predominantly hierarchical, vertical, nature. This
is best demonstrated by the fact that the court itself, and only the
court, determines the precise content of the duty to cooperate.
Furthermore, traditional obstacles to surrender, which would
make no sense in light of the particular nature and mandate of the
ICC, have not found their way into the Statute.
Whether the model is fair, in that it adequately protects the
rights of the requested person, the overall judgment can only be
positive. Compared to the legal frameworks of the ICTR and
ICTY, the ICC Statute constitutes an improvement. It makes the
right to liberty and security of persons its primary concern by
imposing clear obligations on the arresting and detaining state.
The respect for this right in practice depends on the question of
whether the arresting and detaining state and the ICC can
mutually supervise their respective activities. Thus, the court
should supervise the legality of the arrest and detention at the
national level. The provision of effective legal remedies, if
necessary, is an indispensable element of such supervision.
Following the procedure envisaged by Article 97, the requested
state must not be hesitant to review the surrender in light of
human rights obligations and must submit to human rights
considerations, if necessary, as an obstacle to surrender. It is to be
hoped and expected, that this situation will not occur in practice.

These "internationalized tribunals" do not in any way enjoy the benefit of a vertical
cooperation relationship and can only count on existing and applicable mechanisms of
interstate legal assistance. As a result, a considerable amount of evidence-and a
considerable number of suspects-could be beyond their reach. On the other hand, the
"internationalized tribunals," with the exception of the Sierra Leone court, have the
advantage of being integrated into a domestic legal order, enabling them to exercise
enforcement powers over a certain territory.
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